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Sri Lanka Army

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Transformation from Offensives to be the Leading Reconciler in Post-War Sri Lanka is Significant- Maj Gen Goonetilleke Tells Seminar Delegates

In his analysis to the delegates attending the ‘Defence Seminar-2013’ on the much-talked ‘Role of Armed Forces in Reconciliation’, Major General H.C.P Goonetilleke, Director General General Staff at Office of the Chief of Defence Staff, elaborated how the civilians under the clutches of LTTE terrorism survived and the transition of the Army from the offensive to humanitarian well-being took place by becoming front line reconciler and saviour of freedom, peace and prosperity of the rescued Tamil community.

“It was a matter of capacity, versatility and accessibility of the Army that made it to engage in the reconciliation process. The military was the most reliable alternative that had the capacity and the versatility to cope with the demands of the post conflict situation. The military exploited its inherent flexibility to assist in regenerating the capacity of the government structures.  Further accessibility or the lack of it was hindering the reach for the rest of the stakeholders. The military had to open the gateway which was arduous and time consuming. Second; is the engagement of the military in the reconciliation process justified? The military was engaged within the provisions of the law of the land that provides for the military to assist the civil authority in activities such as rehabilitation, reconstruction, and resettlement that lead into the reconciliation process.

The military in Sri Lanka was compelled to tread into the unknown territory of reconciliation due to sheer circumstances. If not for the experience gained by pioneering the process, we too would have been carried away by the notion that the military has little or no relevance in the process of reconciliation. The Sri Lankan model proves otherwise. I will not contradict myself by proposing it’s potential for replication. Nevertheless it may inspire the global military and political leadership somewhere sometime,” Major General H.C.P Goonetilleke said.

Lieutenant General Daya Ratnayake upon the conclusion of his speech presented him with a memento.

 
 

Here is the full text of his contribution to the sessions on the inaugural day;

Reconciliation means several things to different people. Therefore in my endeavour, I will essentially pull together some thoughts on reconciliation and move on to the Sri Lankan perspective on the Role of the Military in Reconciliation.

The most common phenomena about Reconciliation is that no one agrees how to define it or do it. The absence of consensus is observed not only among scholars and their writings but is reflected in policy circles, within governments, donor agencies, and so on. It also finds parallels among most actors in real post conflict contexts such as victims, offenders, religious and cultural organizations. Paradoxically while the confusion remains the term gains steadily in usage and importance.  

Amidst this variance there is explicit consensus on several features of reconciliation; there is no perfect reconciliation method or model that is applicable universally. Therefore those who face the challenge of post conflict peace building should trust their own capacity to take what advice they get from elsewhere but to be creative in developing their own original model. It is a long term process that has no quick fix. It is a deep process which demands changes in aspirations, emotions, feelings and even beliefs. It is also a very broad process which applies not only to those who suffered directly and those who inflicted the suffering but extends to the community wide element.  

An exploration of the effect of reconciliation in conflict resolution during the last century reveals that 64% of the countries where a reconciliation event occurred did not experience a subsequent violent conflict. On the contrary only 9% of the countries where a reconciliation process did not occur after conflict avoided a return to conflict.

So its significance is established although there is no consensus on what the term encompasses what it excludes, where it links with other post conflict initiatives, and how it functions.

In the most simple terms, Reconciliation is a process through which a society moves from a divided past to a shared future. IDEA further elaborates; “Reconciliation prevents, once and for all, the use of the past as the seed of renewed conflict. It consolidates peace, breaks the cycle of violence and strengthens newly established or reintroduced democratic institutions.”  Although this definition is general, it nonetheless captures the essence of reconciliation the most effectively. Building on IDEA’s definition, David Bloomberg further defines reconciliation:

“Reconciliation is a process of gradually (re)building broad social relationships between communities alienated by sustained and widespread violence, so that over time they can negotiate the realities and compromises of a new, shared socio – political reality. It has four main instruments:

a.    A justice process that punishes violence and deters future repetition; and justice reform that is built on human rights principles, democratic practice and international legal norms and that promises fairness in the future.

b.    A process of acknowledging experiences, uncovering unknown events, giving voice to the previously unheard  and addressing interpretations of history: often referred to as truth seeking or truth telling

c.    A process of healing, whereby  victims repair their  lives by coming to terms with their suffering

d.    A process of reparation through real and /or symbolic compensation for loss

Further these four elements are all tightly linked, cross cutting and interdependent. We might also add a fifth instrument: development. Right across the literature and practice of the field, the argument is continually and forcefully made that none of these components, nor indeed the overall process, can succeed without the direct underpinning of economic development.”

The traditional framework for reconciliation is a hybridization of several different authors and institutions within the field of reconciliation studies.  It relies on the four dimensions; security, justice, truth and healing. These dimensions help to better organize and understand the methods employed in reconciliation.

From this framework, two general categories emerge: structural reconciliation and psychological reconciliation. Structural reconciliation concerns the structural aspects of a society’s political, legal, economic, and security systems. While structural reconciliation methods are relatively straightforward and necessary, they usually cannot affect a successful reconciliation process that leads to a stable peace on their own. Psychological reconciliation involves the more complex domain of emotional healing, spiritual considerations, cultural identities and narratives, and cognitive perceptions.  

While most reconciliation frameworks do not distinguish between the two categories, it makes sense for such distinction in order to avoid concentrating on one category while neglecting the other.

The universal perception of the role of the military in reconciliation is conflicting. The proponents of the traditional framework for reconciliation argue that the application of military power to coerce opposing parties to reconcile will be ineffective, unsuccessful and contradictory to the foundational principles of reconciliation. In their view stabilizing a divided society will be an expensive and lengthy endeavour. Moreover if the conflicting groups within that state have not accepted defeat and do not genuinely desire reconciliation, stability operations will likely require a counter insurgency effort that will be even more expensive, lengthy and unfortunately bloody. These arguments emanate from the experience in intrastate conflicts in South Africa, Rwanda and Northern Ireland.

The more contemporary view on the role of the military in reconciliation is at the other extreme. It draws inspiration from the military surge in Iraq in 2007 and its preliminary success. As Dr Micheal Mosser posits, it advocates an “Armed Reconciler” performing a “forcing function” and advances the notion of armed reconcilers who can “push a society towards reconciliation”.

I will not juxtapose that with the foundational principles of reconciliation or the outcome in Iraq but rather leave it to your own comprehension.

As Danniel and Bennink notes; psychological reconciliation usually begins before the cessation of hostilities “…when the parties in conflict start to change their beliefs, attitudes, goals, motivations, and emotions about the conflict, each other, and future relations – all in the direction of reconciliation.” Sri Lanka is no exception; the reconciliation process commenced much before the conflict ended. The government had to address distinct needs of the society at crucial stages without which the hope of reconciliation would have only been an illusion. These timely interventions afforded the space and opened the path for process of reconciliation. These specific interventions are discusses in the subsequent paragraphs.

By 2009 the already fractured Tamil Community was trapped in the clutches of the insurgents. The insurgents who eternally attempted to portray themselves as the saviours of the Tamil People had fractured the very community that they were to save. The Tamil community in the North was now forced to shield their purported guardians from eminent extinction. The resultant siege drove the people to mutiny against their “guardians” and the “guardians” shot to kill their people who tried to escape captivity. The already fractured Tamil Community was beginning to dissipate. It was a matter of time for the military to experience the hither to elusive reward in a counter insurgency campaign. This is when the Sri Lankan society intervened to redeem the Community in captivity. The intervention was obviously spearheaded by the Military. The military launched an unprecedented rescue operation in contemporary history across the now famous Nandikandal Lagoon for the besieged to access the rest of the Nation. They moved across from a “state of fear to a state of non violence”.

Reconciliation is an institutional imperative. The Military transited from an institution of ceremonial paraphernalia to the defensive, to the offensive and to humanitarian wellbeing over a period of three decades. The military transformed from victor to reconciler instantly as the besieged walked across the lagoon.  The simple act of meeting former suspiciously separated parties over a shared meal tendered a great deal of ice breaking of unfounded fears and hatred igniting the hope of reconciliation. The empathy that emanated may have sown the seeds of confidence among the suspicious to be encouraged to enter the healing process that was to follow; the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission. The military in Sri Lanka led the way by example for all other institutions to move from a feeling of war and violence to a feeling of peace and freedom through the spontaneous transformation from victor to “Frontline Reconciler” - A foreground catalyst in the reconciliation process

The physically and psychologically battered community that emerged through the lagoon was wrapped into a mono ethnic, single narrative of separatism. Separatism sought only through violence. An appetite for violence that obscured the enticing mechanisms incorporated in to the Indo Lanka Agreement and instigated the elimination of generations of moderates from their own Community.  The Military, which is part of the Sri Lankan society and represents all what the big society goes through, was the first to engage them with a cross cutting understanding of a nation of many cultures, many religions and many ethnicities.  The engagement was the first taste of coexistence of hither to polarized entities.

The military did not stop there. It went beyond to restore the strongest indigenous structure of the State – The Civil Administrative Service.  The public servants who played a subservient role towards the insurgents were duly recognized of their standing in the Civil Administrative Service of Sri Lanka instantly and were encouraged and partnered by the military to discharge their duties without fear or favour for the benefit of the population they were appointed to serve. They linked the community with the rest of stake holders in the reconciliation process.

The movement from fear to non violence and the acceptance of coexistence did not mean much. The community which was rescued was displaced. A considerable extent of land was left contaminated with land mines by the end of the conflict in May 2009. This denied the displaced access to their homes, it denied access for agencies willing to assist in recovery, and it prevented rehabilitation and reconstruction of essential infrastructure. It even rendered the Tamil political leadership based in the South somewhat inaccessible to the community.

This is when the military stepped in again. They were not alone and were partnered by several agencies in an ambitious humanitarian demining campaign. The military de miners spearheaded the effort clearing 90% of the contaminated area within a period of less than 3 years.

The Military virtually opened the gateway for the rest of the nation and the rest of the world for rapid political, economic and social engagement. “A movement form security to freedom” without which no amount of desire for reconciliation would have meant anything.

The impact was enormous. Nearly 300 000 displaced people were united with their families, resettled, and provided with amenities such as education, vocational training and livelihood. Approximately 12 0000 ex combatants who surrendered were taken care of de – radicalized rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. All through an indigenous model developed by the military and partnered by the civil society in application.

Four years in to post conflict, the structural aspects of political, administrative, legal and economic systems are functioning and are being streamlined. The psychological aspects are gradually gaining ground. The role of the frontline reconciler is fading away.

The possible re emergence of terrorism, emergence of other extremist groups, creation of ethnic divisions and communal violence, challenges to maritime security and border control, growing rate of organized crime, and nontraditional threats through technology driven media are key to shaping National Security Strategy and determining the orientation of the military. The military evolves to suit contemporary threats to National Security.

The global drivers of conflict such as, global competition for resources, residual territorial claims, ideology, ethnic tension and the desire for power will remain as sources of instability that push parties towards persistent conflict which will complicate international relations. They will remain as sources of instability pushing parties towards persistent conflict complicating international relations and create a state of uncertainty within and outside the region. Sri Lanka will not be spared of this phenomenon and the military will continue to promote peace through security and stability that will enable economic growth to outlive the enduring process of reconciliation.

All these interventions when put together in abstract construct the Sri Lankan model of the role of the military in reconciliation.

I like to call it “I-3”. “I – 3” because it is all about imperatives, imperatives and the resultant impact. So I term it I – 3 Sri Lanka. The functioning of this model is dependent upon the push - pull engagement between the military and the rest of the stakeholders. The engagement thrives on a whole of a government, coordinated approach where each partner understands the capabilities and the limitations of the other. More over every partner supports and encourages each other’s role play as necessitated by the prevailing circumstances. The reconciliatory imperatives in the centre column and the transformational imperative on the right deliver the social impact on the left which are benchmarks in the spectrum of reconciliation.

My discourse will be incomplete if I do not refer to the most common concerns on the role of the military in reconciliation in Sri Lanka. So I will touch upon it briefly. First; why did the military engage in the reconciliation process? It was a matter of capacity, versatility and accessibility. The long drawn conflict weakened the administrative structures. These structures in situ lacked the capacity to cope with post conflict demands. The military was the most reliable alternative that had the capacity and the versatility to cope with the demands of the post conflict situation. The military exploited its inherent flexibility to assist in regenerating the capacity of the government structures. Further accessibility or the lack of it was hindering the reach for the rest of the stakeholders. The military had to open the gateway which was arduous and time consuming. Second; is the engagement of the military in the reconciliation process justified? The military was engaged within the provisions of the law of the land that provides for the military to assist the civil authority in activities such as rehabilitation, reconstruction, and resettlement that lead into the reconciliation process.
   
The military in Sri Lanka was compelled to tread into the unknown territory of reconciliation due to sheer circumstances. If not for the experience gained by pioneering the process, we too would have been carried away by the notion that the military has little or no relevance in the process of reconciliation. The Sri Lankan model proves otherwise. I will not contradict myself by proposing it’s potential for replication. Nevertheless it may inspire the global military and political leadership somewhere sometime.

Finally I wish to draw your attention to a quote by His Excellency Mahinda Rajapakse the Executive President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka which epitomizes the nature of role of the military in pioneering the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka.

"Therefore, we did not attempt to respond to the terrorists in their own language. When the terrorists were calling for war, we responded with a humanitarian operation. Our troops went to this operation carrying a gun in one hand, the Human Rights Charter in the other, hostages on their shoulders, and the love of their children in their hearts."

We in the military in Sri Lanka cannot wish for a better complement than that!