HAD the Tigers succeeded in assassinating Army Chief Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka in late April 2006 and Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa seven months later, the enemy would have had the upper hand in the Eelam war IV. The government’s war effort would have suffered an irreparable setback. Therefore, Monday’s hostage rescue mission carried out by the army wouldn’t have materialised.
Three years after surviving a suicide attack, Fonseka, undoubtedly Sri Lanka’s most successful service commander has led the ground forces into the last LTTE stronghold on the north-eastern coast.
The army is on the threshold of wiping out what is left of the much talked about LTTE’s conventional fighting capability on the 9 anniversary of its worst ever battlefield defeat in the entire eelam war. The LTTE overran the strategic Elephant Pass base, headquarters to the army’s 54 Division in April, 2000.
The war veteran succeeded Lt. Gen. Shantha Kottegoda on December 6, 2005 within days after the LTTE directed mine attacks on the army deployed in the Jaffna peninsula. The assassination bid was followed by an abortive attempt to blast a passenger ship carrying over 700 security forces and police personnel returning to the Jaffna peninsula in May, 2006.
The LTTE expected a decisive battlefield victory swiftly. The removal of Fonseka, the first Sinha Regiment officer to command the army before the launch of its ground offensive had been a critical element of its overall plan. LTTE fighting formations, Sea Tigers and the so-called Air Tigers as well as their suicide squads had been reduced to pulp.
The attempted assassination of Gotabhaya Rajapaksa who had given up a lucrative private sector employment in the US to join President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s team, too, had been of vital importance to the LTTE plan. His assassination would have paralysed the President.
While Fonseka had kept the ground offensive on track, the Defence Secretary thwarted repeated attempts to pressure the President to return to the negotiating table and in some instances give in to various LTTE demands. A simmering dispute over the Defence Secretary’s decision not to re-open the civilian entry/exit point at Muhamalai is a case in point. This also contributed to the then Foreign Minister Mangala Samaraweera’s decision to quit the Rajapaksa administration. To the credit of the Defence Secretary, he never allowed domestic issues to distract the government from its war effort. He fiercely resisted efforts by a section of the international community to throw a lifeline to the LTTE, in some instances to the sheer embarrassment of the government. The bottom line is that the Defence Secretary fashioned Sri Lanka’s tough response to international criticism and the rest simply followed him.
Both Fonseka and Rajapaksa had been at the receiving end of criticism directed at the government’s faltering human rights record, particularly over the past two years. But they relentlessly pursued their controversial military strategy until the enemy gradually lost its will to fight.
The SLAF and navy, too, met the LTTE challenge head-on. Under the able leadership of Air Marshal Roshan Gunatilleke and Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, the services achieved tremendous and unparalleled success. The destruction of the enemy’s overseas sea supply routes including the one from Tamil Nadu and devastating aerial bombardment demoralised the LTTE. To the navy’s immense credit, it cleverly handled the operations in the Gulf of Mannar despite on and off protests launched by both Tamil Nadu administration and the Indian Central government. The presence of Indian fishermen in Sri Lankan territorial waters, the unholy alliance between the LTTE and a section of the Tamil Nadu administration and the relationship between the Centre and the Tamil Nadu administration compounded the situation. But the navy kept its strategy on track. The navy acknowledged that an LTTE suicide attack on a transit point at Diganpothna which claimed the lives of 101 officers and men in September 2006 was its worst setback. Nothing could have been as bad as losing 100 trained men on a single day. The navy also lost several vessels, mostly Israeli and locally-built Fast Attack Craft during eelam war IV. The LTTE also targeted major navy bases but never succeeded in overwhelming the navy which maintained the Trincomalee-Kankesanthurai sea supply route.
The LTTE triggered major ground battles in August 2006 with an attempt to disrupt the Trincomalee-KKS lifeline. Although the LTTE swiftly gained the upper hand, the army fought back and within a month launched its own offensive. The ground forces never turned back.
In fact, the LTTE would have been ready for an all out war back in August 2005 when it assassinated the then Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar at his Colombo residence. The LTTE would have been ready for any eventuality when it ordered a hit on the statesman.
LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham during the abortive LTTE-Government meeting in Geneva shortly after the last presidential election, revealed their readiness to exploit the situation. To the embarrassment of the Sri Lankan delegation, Balasingham declared that they had infiltrated the armed forces at the highest level and the government should be prepared to face the consequences in the event of an outbreak of hostilities.
The police and particularly its elite para-military force the STF played an important role in action against the LTTE. Former STF Commandant Senior DIG Nimal Lewke spearheaded police efforts against the LTTE.
The rapid expansion of the Civil Defence Force (CDF), too, had been a significant element in the overall security strategy. One of the major difficulties faced by the armed forces and police over the years was the reluctance of successive governments to boost armed forces’ strength to meet the LTTE challenge. Despite severe economic constrains, the government authorised a large scale expansion with the army recruiting over 80,000 men. The army wouldn’t have made headway without having the required manpower. The recruitment and deployment of fresh troops wouldn’t have been possible without upgrading training facilities. The army top brass worked overtime to raise new fighting formations which led the offensive action on the Vanni front. In keeping with the overall strategy, the SLAF and the navy, too, bolstered their manpower. To facilitate the deployment of the army for offensive action, the two services expanded their ground deployment in the northern and eastern theatres. The expansion of Special Boat Squadron, setting up of the Rapid Action Boat Squadron and heavy air support, particularly close-air-support provided by Number 9 Attack Helicopter Squadron, too, brought the LTTE under immense pressure.
Lt. Gen. Fonseka deployed the 57 Division in March 2007, Task Force I (Subsequently named 58 Division) in September the same year same year and 59 Division in January 2008 to liberate the Vanni region. The army also raised several Task Forces to support the Vanni offensive while 53 and 55 Divisions joined the final battle after crossing the Elephant Pass causeway in January this year. The 55 Division was led by Brigadier Prasanna Silva who commanded troops during the eastern offensive.
The 58 Division which launched operations on the north-western coast under Brigadier Shavindra Silva’s command fought its way to north-eastern coast on Monday thereby being the first fighting formation to move west-east across the country. The 57 Division commanded by Major General Jagath Dias liberated Kilinochchi after fighting its way through the Vanni (west) mainland while Brigadier Nandana Udawatte’s 59 Division captured Mullaitivu on the north-eastern coast. The 59 Division faced some of the fiercest resistance encountered in jungle fighting.
The recoveries made by the army on the Vanni front, particularly in areas east of the A9 road highlighted the existence of a massive arms supply network financed by the Tamil Diaspora. The LTTE had SA 14 surface to air missiles of Soviet origin to a range of Chinese armaments including 152 mm and 130 mm artillery pieces. The recoveries included mobile four barrelled 14.5 mm anti-aircraft guns also of Chinese origin. The recovery of several specially-built sea craft capable of mounting suicide attacks and move senior cadres stealthily revealed the existence of a top secret programme conducted with the expertise of foreigners of South East Asian origin. The LTTE had a range of equipment in its arsenal secured in various parts of the world including the west.
Coupled with its awesome firepower, the LTTE had well trained units which carried out some devastating attacks on the armed forces. The SLAF suffered its worst ever setback when a commando-style operation destroyed aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles worth millions USD at its Anuradhapura airbase in October 2007. The LTTE also mounted on and off air attacks on the city and its suburbs and made an attempt to hit passenger carrier ‘Jetliner’ anchored off Trincomalee much to the embarrassment of the SLAF. Had Tigers succeeded in their bid to bomb the Katunayake-based jet squadrons or direct an underwater attack at the Colombo harbour, the government would have been placed in an extremely difficult position. The LTTE also raided the Galle harbour and the Delft Island. But, they never managed to derail the military campaign.
Although some felt that the army wouldn’t be in a position to sustain its thrust after taking heavy losses on the Muhamalai front beginning with its October 2006 attempt to liberate the peninsula, the army achieved tremendous success within two years. Fighting forces made tremendous sacrifices over the past two and half years to bring the LTTE down to its knees. The infantry, Special Forces and Commandos spearheaded the campaign.
The Intelligence Services spearheaded by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) scored some significant success against the LTTE. Although the LTTE stunned the government by targeting Fonseka and Gotabhaya Rajapaksa in the city and took several other targets elsewhere, intelligence services hit back hard. The LTTE experienced an unprecedented crackdown as intelligence services eliminated LTTE operatives on secret missions in various parts of the country. An LTTE led campaign supported by a section of the print and electronic media failed to stop the crackdown. The INGOs and NGOs, too, made attempts to come to the Tigers’ rescue without success.
To the credit of the army, the top brass never even considered pulling out the contingent serving under the UN command in the Caribbean Island of Haiti in support of the war effort. A battalion of infantry troops is among the 1000 strong contingent deployed there under an agreement reached during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the Prime Minister.
The UNP felt that the government couldn’t sustain its campaign. The UNP asserted that the LTTE wouldn’t succumb to military pressure and President Rajapaksa, too, would end up a casualty. The UNP’s assertion was reflected by MP Ravi Karunanayake’s damaging statement in Parliament. As the army battled the LTTE outside Kilinochchi, the outspoken MP said that the government meant Medawachchiya when it talked of taking Kilinochchi. Similarly it meant Pamankada when it mentioned Ali Mankada. UNP spokesman Lakshman Kiriella told a press conference that any fool could wage war shortly after UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe said that Thoppigala was nothing but a large jungle.
The President has cleverly exploited unprecedented battlefield success to politically destroy the LTTE. Contrary to the expectations of the opposition, a section of the media and the international community, the government had captured power in the first ever Eastern PC and the North Central, Sabaragamuwa, Central and Wayamba PCs comfortably. With major battles rapidly coming to an end on the Vanni front, the outcome of the forthcoming elections to the WP, too, is a forgone conclusion. (Courtesy : The Island)
