Session 3 Turns More Interesting with Army &;amp; Other Contributors

The Session 3 of the Day 1 at the ‘Defence Seminar’ sub themed ‘Terrorism and Challenges to National Security’ drew the attention of all the participants in a big way as presentations of Major General B.A Perera, Mr Yasantha Kodagoda, Dr Ajai Sahni and HE Yi Xianliang, Ambassador of China to Sri Lanka took the centre stage with several interesting queries and explanations.

Major General B.A Perera, Director General General Staff (DGGS) at the Army Headquarters in his presentation on ‘Insurgency, Terrorism, Non-State Actors’ made an elaborate analysis of how insurgency, terrorism and non-state actors are identified and defined, mostly based on his academic experiences and intellectual capacity.   
 
Here is the full text of his presentation coloured with images and photos;

“Non-State Actors could be defined as individuals or organizations that have powerful economic, political or social power and are able to influence at national and sometimes at international level but do not belong to or ally themselves to any particular country or state.

Non-State Actors could be broadly categorized into two:

Non Violent and Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA).
 
Sub-State Actors, Inter Governmental Organizations (IGO’s), Trans National Actors are some of the examples of Non-Violent Non-State Actors vs Violent Non State Actors (VNSA) are referred to as an existing constellation of terrorist, insurgent, guerrilla, extremist, political or religious resistance, and organized crime structural units such as quasi-states, movements and even the empowered individuals operating worldwide.

What makes them different from the Cold War-era is almost complete disappearance of “patron-proxy” relationships with the states and thereafter Violent Non-State Actors have become independent actors in global politico-military settings.

INTER-STATE TO INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS

Since the end of the ‘Cold War’, there has been a paradigm shift in attention from inter-state wars to intra-state and global level conflicts.

Even during the Cold War both inter- and intra-state conflicts were the cause of great concern because of the super-power rivalry between the two huge nuclear powers, the US and USSR, who were often behind-the-scene string pullers. In 1991/ Kalevi Holsti wrote that ‘the wars of the late twentieth century are not about foreign policy, security, honour, or status; they are about statehood, governance, and the role and status of nations and communities within states’.

Michael Brown also confirms that internal dynamics take precedence over international relations and issues.

Further, by the mid-1990s it became evident and the ‘internal conflicts’, ‘new wars’, ‘small wars,’ ‘civil wars’, or the ‘ethnic conflicts’, became the order of the day in post-colonial states.

True enough, what Holsti speculated became reality surprisingly in assessment of the waning in the ‘relative incidence’ of inter-state, as against, intra-state conflict highlighted in the yearbook statistical analyses published in 1990s. 

According to scholarly rationale underlying these conflict trajectories, some experts share thoughts on the development of contemporary warfare to the evolution of the contemporary state, characteristically, cascaded in the materialization of the sovereign secessionist state in Europe, prefigured by Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes, the concept of sovereignty and national self-determination triggered by the American and French Revolutions and the post-1945 bipolar structure at Great Power level; the very first reason,  the emergence of the so-called sovereign secessionist state in Europe is associated with the trigger of the early modern interstate warfare with the use of  domestic monopolization and reorganization of military forces by sovereigns.

While the second reason related to the American and French revolutions prompted the transition to conventional national armies and ‘total war’ complementary to the first Industrial Revolution and the Romantic Movement which culminated in the 1st and 2nd World Wars, the final reason, the post-1945 bipolar structure fuelled by the advent of nuclear weapons played on the chess board of interstate war while simultaneously triggering the conflicts of domestic liberation associated with, decolonization in 1950s and 60s and the post-colonial civil wars of 1970s and 80s, a game played by the great powers in their pursuit of geopolitical clout.

Against this backdrop, Edward Rice calls the contemporary post-1945 pattern of warfare, / ‘wars of the third kind,’ the struggle of ‘national liberation’ or those resisted against external domination, colonialism, exclusion and persecution by the post-colonial states.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

One of the contemporary theories that best explains intra-state cleavages is the Relative Deprivation (RD) a construct first communicated by Suchman Stouffer, now widely used in social sciences.
Further, in the arena of social movement research Relative Deprivation is used to explain the notion of resource mobilization to understand the reasons for people to engage in communal behavior that results from grievances.

Further, the theoretical work of Crosby in 1976 has led to formulate the required prerequisites to experience RD.

However, later in 1982 Crosby reduced the so-called numerous prerequisites to two: desire for something that one does not possess and the feeling that one deserves it.

On the other hand, as the Cold War ended, Samuel Huntington hypothesized the theory of Clash of Civilizations that advocated that the gap of prospective clashes would fall along the lines of great civilizations: primarily the West verses the Rest. 

He proposed that on the termination of the Cold War, the next struggle among the peoples would be on cultural instead of ideological lines.

INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM

Against this backdrop of conflict, a large number of sovereign states around the globe are entangled in the challenge of insurgency and terrorism.

Even though it is identified as a threat, in the case of irregular warfare, the demarcation between terrorism and insurgency is very vague.

Therefore, proper identification of the perpetrators is essential in countering this threat.

David C. Rapoport, one of the leading scholars on counter-terrorism has identified four waves of terrorism-Anarchist Wave, Colonial and Anti Colonial Wave, New Left Wave and the Religious/Ethnic Wave.

However, David also in his explanation fails to differentiate terrorism and insurgency separately and, instead, groups both in one category-terrorism.

Similarly, Richardson and Arts in their research efforts have misinterpreted and used the terms insurgency and terrorism in a confused manner.

Basically, they have identified insurgents also as terrorists.

Even though Richardson argues that goals of all terrorist groups fall into one of two categories as “those groups that relied solely or primarily on terror tactics and those that resorted to both terror and guerrilla tactics”. 

This same idea has previously been projected by Wieviorka when he argues that insurgents use terror as a ‘method of action’ and terrorists use the same as a ‘logic of action’.
 
Both these theories are somewhat confusing and thereby defining ‘terrorism’ and ‘insurgency’ drawing clear-cut demarcations seems to be difficult.

Building upon Wieviorka’s theory, Marks elaborates salient aspects where he defines both terms with a separate individual identity.

His explanation seems to be one of the few guidelines available in the current literature that can be applied meaningfully to formulate counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism responses.


However, for the purpose of this discussion of insurgency terrorism and non-state actors the social movement framework of Rodney Stark, terrorism framework of Donatella Della Porta, combined framework of Michel Wieviorka and Thomas A. Marks have been utilized.

Reasons for Social Movements to Occur        

As shown on the screen, according to Stark, when there are gaps in a state’s economic, social and political opportunity structures societal grievances are manifested.

As per Stark’s findings, there are four reasons for a social movement to occur:

•    Grievances,
•    Hope,
•    Precipitating events,
•    The movement’s ability to compile social networks to enhance the recruitment for the organization.

If the government is able to mediate, negotiate and implement social changes the Social Movement would end itself.

Reasons for Social Movements to Succeed        

Further, Stark argues on four prerequisites for a social movement to succeed and they are;

•    Mobilization of people and resources,
•    Capability to overcome external opposition,
•    Enlisting external allies from other major groups and powerful institutions in the society
or to keep them neutral.
•    A social movement arises in response to a grievance that is widely shared,
and when substantial resources are available,
a number of organizations demanding action will emerge.

Though these movements cooperate with each other, they often compete rather vigorously.

When the government is unable to mediate, negotiate and implement the social changes grievances become non-mediated interests.
 
DELLA PORTA’S TERRORISM FRAMEWORK 

‘Della Porta’s framework’ on the other hand, analyses how non-mediated interests, develop into violent clandestine activities.

According to Della Porta, in a certain society when non-mediated interests remain, people tend to engage in nonviolent as well as violent repertoire.

Nonviolent repertoire, for example, could be the legal means such as protest waves as that was utilized by Mahatma Gandhi in his mass protest movement against the British Raj, whereas violent repertoire of illegal means of protest, as Della Porta suggests, is the socialization of ‘nets of individuals to violent form of action.’

These groups are motivated through radical ideologies.

The nets or the individuals using violent action could be categorized into two: groups using violence irregularly to get some payback and groups using violence regularly basically against the state and opposing public. 

This second category, the groups using violence regularly could be formed into two other sub categories who does not create illegal structures, Such as groups fighting for anti globalism riots and who creates illegal structures to engage in clandestine operations against state.

According to Della Porta, these illegal structures are divided into two more sub categories; groups using strategic choice of clandestinity and the groups using strategic choice other than clandestinity.

In her framework, she only discusses the evolution and development of non-mediated interests of the people and why the groups are using violent repertorie by anti-state organizations down to the groups using strategic choice of clandestinity and strategic choice other than clandestinity.
 
However, she does not specifically define terrorism and insurgency separately in her model.

MARKS AND WIEVIORKAR’S TERRORISM FRAMEWORK 

Advancing further from Della Porta’s findings, Wieviorka’s and Marks’ conceptual framework as shown will dissect the acts of strategic choice of clandestinity and strategic choices other than clandestinity of rebels by observing their behavior up the framework as depicted and finally it arrives at a conclusion how to differentiate insurgents from terrorists.

In this framework, / if a group of rebels who have progressed down the ladder depicted on the screen, engages in acts of violence ‘as a logic of action,’ they are terrorists; here, what they mean by ‘logic of action’ is worthy of exploration.

‘Logic of action’ as delineated by Marks and Wieviorka here means, if a rebel group which has persistent non-mediated grievances engaging in acts of violence does not have a plan for achieving a clear-cut ultimatum of an end-state,  their chosen act(s) of violence end after the completion of one particular task until they maneuver another afresh later.

If an example is derived from the contemporary conflict scenario to clarify this matter further, the groups / which do not have a plan for achieving a clear-cut ultimatum of an end-state are the groups such as modern day al-Qaeda or for that matter Somalian Sea Pirates, for they do not pursue any end-state of achieving liberation or regime change.

These groups do not create a mass base and thus follow the path of violence having selected the path of “strategic choice of clandestinity” as explained by Della Porta.

This has been further refined by the explanations of Marks’ and Wieviorka’s classifications.

Let me now compare some of the similarities and dissimilarities of Insurgency and Terrorism using the three frameworks already examined.

What Marks and Wievorka espouse here is that the insurgents are a group of rebels who also have particular non-mediated interests engaging in violence while their aim being an end-state such as achieving liberation or regime change for which examples could widely be drawn from Sri Lanka’s JVP movement to modern day Human Uprisings.

Further, elaborating on insurgency, Marks states that ‘[t]he central activity of insurgency is the construction of a counter-state [and] is an armed political movement aimed at the overthrowing of a constituted government, or separation from it, through use of subversion and armed conflict.’

His next conclusion is that ‘[p]olitical power is the central issue in an insurgency.

Insurgents thus mount political challenges to the state through the formation of a counter - state.’

He then argues that ‘…perpetrators of terror can be effective in cases of terrorism as ‘a logic of action’, often referred to as [‘] pure terrorism,[‘] because the terrorists essentially are the movement…. [and the] insurgencies frequently seek to overthrow the exiting social order and reallocate power within the country.”

CONCLUSION

This slide shows a combination of all three frameworks of Stark, Della porta, Marks and Wievorka.
This gives the flow or the gradual development of a non-mediated grievance into an Insurgency or Terrorism-based problem.

In the modern day insurgencies, the trend is to focus more on terror tactics  or use of ‘terrorism as a logic of action’ rather than other modes of operandi used by the insurgents.
 
Most modern intellectuals introduce this phenomenon as a ‘hybrid combination’ of organized crime, insurgency and terrorism.

Insurgencies are basically based on internal issues and a local solution within a state is required to settle such issues.

However, as terrorism is a globalised threat which has the capacity to operate disregarding any geographical, social or cultural boundaries the counter-terrorist approach also has to be addressed in the same manner at global level.

It grips the states around the world today with its ability to strike at places and times of its own choice, with the intent to cause maximum destruction to the innocent civilian life and their property threatening state sovereignty, international peace and harmony.

How to respond effectively to terrorism without compromising democratic liberties, and to deal with the current generation of terrorists without aggravating the situation in the process are the two fundamental challenges faced by these states today.

Many renowned international organizations including the United Nations have identified terrorism as a threat to good governance, international order and the stability of all states.

Thus, it has now become a global problem which needs a global solution.

"Reaffirming …….prevent and combat terrorism."


The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted by Member States on the 08th of Sept in 2006.

Though this strategy could be considered as a unique global instrument that could enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter-terrorism As President Karsai mentioned in his key note address the lack of individual and collective commitment by the respective members prevent the same being achieved successfully.

To conclude the presentation let me draw your attention to a few key measures recommended by the UN to prevent and combat terrorism.

1.    Refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, financing, encouraging, or tolerating terrorist activities.
2.    Cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism.
3.    Ensure the apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts.
4.    Intensify cooperation, as appropriate, in exchanging timely and accurate information.
5.    Coordination and cooperation among States in combating crimes such as drug trafficking, illicit arms trading, money laundering and smuggling of NBC and radiological materials.”