Dr. Matteo Legrenzi, Associate Professor of International Relations School of International Relations, Ca Foscari University of Venice speaking on ‘Identification of Security Priorities at Global and Regional Levels’ in his presentation tried to seek a broader definition on the term, ‘Security’ as it has now crossed all conventional borders and there exists a paradigm shift.
Following are the summary excerpts from his presentation;
Identification of Security Priorities at the Global and Regional Levels
Structure of the Presentation
• A bit of theory: security by who for whom?
• The new Middle East Cold War.
• Beyond the Sectarianism framework.
• The Basics: what does not change.
• Some current and past policy troops.
• Where do we go from here.
Security as a contested concept in the Middle East
• What is security in the Middle East? How fungible is power? Security by who? For whom?
• Evolution away from positivistic approach introduces instability-of-the-object (Lawson)
• Even in the Middle East there is now talk of “human security” and “responsibility to protect”.
• Traditional military power and political influence are both important.
• More often than not the core foreign policy goal is regime security.
The Middle East as a Security Complex
• Node of concentration in pattern of int’l relations (Buzan, Wæver).
• Distribution of power and historical patterns of amity and enmity that are geographically confined.
• Patterns revolve around border disputes, interest in ethnically overlapping populations, to a much lesser extent around ideological or sectarian motives.
• Strong (still negative) security interdependence among countries of the region.
The Iran-Saudi Rivalry and the new Middle East Cold War
• Filling the contested vacuums in weak states via external manipulative mobilization.
• The main battlegrounds are Bahrain, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and, crucially, Syria.
• Invited by governments and local sub-state actors vying for power.
• Striking resemblance with Arab Cold War of 1950s and 1960s.
Beyond the Sectarian Analytical Framework
• An exclusive focus on sectarianism oversimplifies complex domestic conflicts.
• These are political conflicts with(out) political solutions.
• Iran and Saudi Arabia vie for influence utilizing sectarianism (while denying it).
• They cross sectarian fault lines if they find it expedient (Hamas, Ikhwan, Lebanon).
The Basics: Why GCC armies are organized the way they are
• Unlike Iran it is doubtful whether it would make sense for GCC states to create professional, efficient armies.
• The risks that GCC elites would incur in setting up effective standing armies clearly outweigh the benefits that could be gained in military efficiency.
• The traditional separation between regular army and ‘national guard’(the original Ikhwan) and other units is bound to endure and for good reason.
The Basics: The Need for an Off Shore Balancer
• There is a strong political rationale underpinning the order of battle of GCC armies. Military vulnerabilities are not an issue of technical deficiency.
• Currently and for the foreseeable future, whether they like it or not, the off shore balancer in the Gulf is the United States of America.
• US presence leads to tension between external security and domestic legitimacy. Particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia (Niblock).
• The need for American support will always lend the US leverage vis-à-vis GCC states.
The Tropes: The Rise of China
• China is certainly playing a major role in the economic and commercial sectors.
• Security is different: China has no interest in strategic presence in the Middle East.
• China can free ride on American security role and values immensely its “apolitical” role.
• First priority is relationship with USA.
• China puts the Middle East in same category as other regions important for energy security (Alberta, Africa). No strategic link even if it were sought.
The Tropes: NATO in the Gulf
• Lopsided dialogue: NATO offers capacity building and SSR facilitation, GCC states ask for security guarantees to spread umbrella beyond US.
• But what can NATO do that US is not already doing? SA National Guard trained by Vinnell Corporation since 1975. More of the same.
• It is not by chance that Saudi Arabia is the country expressing more doubts about NATO’s ICI.
• Role of UK and France in Gulf security is important but reluctance to “multilateralize” these bilateral relations (see French in Abu Dhabi, British in Oman).
Saudi Arabia and a new Monarchical Axis
• Reinforcement of monarchical alignment offers Saudi Arabia renovated opportunity to project power.
• Offer of GCC membership, even if just symbolic, formalizes monarchical axis.
• Saudi Arabia actively pursues external change to preserve domestic order.
• Iran, though, is better at external manipulative mobilization.
Saudi strategy vis-à-vis the new Regional Order
• Authoritarian political spaces break up and are reconstituted. Autocracy is locked in.
• SA and GCC states take up institutional tool of Arab League to address Syrian issue alongside UN.
• Yet cooperative transfer of political responsibility does not lessen military dependence on US.
Conclusion
• Functionalization of domestic sectarian divides results in further polarization between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
• Humanitarian and educational catastrophes.
• Current trends point to a war by proxy as long as the last one.
• Further securitization of the region (arms sales, sub-state violence, civil conflicts.)
Where do we go from here?
• To Hell (and back): local truces in Syria offer a glimmer of hope.
• The P5+1 agreement with Iran, strenuously resisted by Israel and SA, may help.
• Generate incentives that make it less appealing for SA and Iran to meddle in weak states.
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